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Individuals plan consumption and production for different points in
the future, using interest rates of various maturities as a guide. How-
ever, individuals do not always pre—contract all planned future borrowing and
lending, and the intermediaries they work through often do not match the
maturity structure of their assets and liabilities. As a result of this
individual failure to hedge and institutional "misinterniediation,t'
aggregate production and consumption plans for each period in the future
need not coincide. The resulting discrepancy will eventually appear as
a recession or boom, involving an unanticipated change in interest rates.
Fiscal stimulus aggravates the welfare loss associated with a recession,
whether the spending is consumption—displacing or wholly wasteful.Introduction
There •is growing dissatisfaction in the economics profession with the
plausibility of Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Many economists would
prefer to see a neoclassical explanation of the overall workings of the
economy, in terms of individuals who try to maximize their welfare, subject
to their budget constraints in conjunction with appropriate prices.
However, it is a challenge to explain business fluctuations in terms
of neoclassical theory, for the budget constraints lead us to Walras' Law,
according to which there cannot be a net surplus of supply over demand when
all markets are considered at once. Yet depressions, which in some sense are
just such a net excess supply, do occur from time to time.
In this paper, we provide a neoclassical explanation of business fluc—
tuatiôns, in terms of intertemporal disequilibrium. There can be an excess
supply of all current output, provided it is matched by an excess demand for
aggregated future output. In a world of institutionalized "misintermedia—
don" like our own, such a disequilibrium can easily come about and will
have serious real costs. We then examine the welfare implications of counter—
recessionary fiscal policy.
The Fisher Model
We begin with Irving Fisher's famous model of the simultaneous determ-
ination of the term structure of interest rates, planned consumption over
time, and planned production over time) Essentially this model is that of a
1Fisher (1930, Part III). Fisher's model provides the basis for Hirsh—
leifer's generalized discrete equilibrium over time (1970, 109—113). As
Harry Johnson has pointed out, ".. .Schumpeter'sstatement that 'some future
historian may well consider Fisher as the greatest of America's scientific
economists up to our own day' [p. 872] has provided If anything too cautious
an accurate prediction of subsequent scientific development: for Fisher's2
.
Wairasianequilibrium,except that instead of n goods available at one point
in time, there is only one good (aggregated consumption output), which can
be available at any of n points in time. Instead of n—l independent Inter—
commodity prices, there are n—i independent intertemporal prices or discount-
ing factors, from which the term structure of interest rates can be readily
calculated. Only n—l of the n equations setting excess demands equal to
zero are necessary to determine the n—i intertemporal prices. By Walras'
law, one of these equations is redundant)
If Fisher's equilibrium term structure prevails, the economy will develop
without business fluctuations, provided there is no unforeseen change in
tastes or technology. As the economy moves forward in time, there will be
no discrepancies between planned production and consumption that arise from
miscoordination of the efforts of individuals. This is the most we as econo—
mists can hope for. Welfare could be improved through better technological
foresight, and individuals would have better luck achieving their ends if
they did not change them in midstream, but these are not catallactic problems
per se.
What Fisher failed to realize is that in the actual world in which we
live, only the excess demand for current output is driven toward zero in the
current period. In terms of current plans, excess demands for output in
insights into monetary theory and capital theory keep his works in live
teaching and scholarly use not only in every major economics department
in the United States but wherever economics is a subject of serious teaching
and research." Johnson's reference is to Schumpeter's History of Economic
Analysis (London, 1954). (Johnson 1977)
is Hirshleifer's "redundant conservation relation" (1970,
113).3
future periods may be positive or negative. Budget constraints imply that
the present discounted value of these excess demands sum to zero, but not
that they individually be zero. When we get to those future periods, these
excess demands (or supplies) will then be driven to zero, but inthe mean-
while, market participants will have been planning to produce either more or
less in future periods than they were planning to consume. These plans will
necessarily be disappointed, and it is these disappointments of plans that
constitute the business fluctuations we explain with our model.
In an n—period world, instead of one redundant equation, there are
actually n—2 degrees of indeterminacy to the set of possible term structures
and corresponding planned consumption and production streams. In the 2—period
world, clearing of the current market together with Wairas' law guarantees clearing
of the future market. However, in the 3—period world, clearing of the current
market and Walras' law leaves one degree of freedom. In a 4—period world
there will be two degrees of freedom, and so on.
His intermediation
The term structure would assume its equilibrium shape if three conditions
were met:
1. If savers put their savings into financial instruments whose matur-
ities corresponded to their dissavings plans.
2. If borrowers borrowed by issuing financial instruments whose
maturities corresponded to their repayment plans.
3. If financial intermediaries matched the maturity structures of
their assets and liabilities.4
Risk aversion in the face of interest rate uncertainty, along the lines
described by Stiglitz (1970), provides savers and borrowers with an incen-
tive to meet conditions 1 and 2 (to the extent that this is worthwhile, given
actual transactions costs), provided they are free to write loan contracts of
any maturity. However, financial intermediaries notoriously do not satisfy
condition 3. Savings and Loan Associations, Mutual Savings Banks, and the
savings departments of Commercial Banks traditionally are based on passbook
accounts, which are virtually demand liabilities. They invest these funds
in more or less long—term assets. In doing so, they are taking an econom-
ically unnecessary speculative position. We call such a mismatching of
asset and liability maturities by an intermediary "misintermediation." The
opposite policy of scrupulously matching maturities could appropriately be
called "balanced intermediation."
In order to understand why thrift institutions misintermediate today, we appar—
ent.ly must go back to the origins of modernbanking inthe thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries. At that time, banks could do whatever they pleased, provided
they did not pay or receive interest. A bank could not promise to pay back
110 florins next year in exchange for 100 florins received this year, because
a contractual obligation to repay more than was received was considered to be
manifest usury, punishable by eternal damnation and, if that did not prove
sufficient disincentive, by secular excommunication and ostracism. However,
there was nothing to stop a bank from taking in a deposit of 100 florins
with the understanding that it would invest this money "at its discretion,"
and then voluntarily give the depositor a "discretionary" extra 10 florins
at the end of the year. These deposits "a discrezione" were the direct
ancestors of our modern passbook—type savings deposits)
1De Roover (1954, 39—40,and 1963, 100—107). By investing these funds
in foreign bills of exchange, the banks were notconsidered to be receiving5
The strict usury doctrine has been defunct in the West since the French
Revolution. If banks were unregulated, we would not expect it to have any
residual effect on bank structure today. However, at least since the
Mercantilist era, banking has possibly been the most closely regulated
industry in the world) Furthermore, finance is more vulnerable to regula-
tion than other industries, since a large part of the value of a loan contract
is the willingness of the courts to recognize and enforce it. And the regu-
latory law the courts recognize is intrinsically resistant to change.
Onereasonfor this resistance, as Dicey has pointed out (1914/63,
41—46), is that if a body of law is reasonably successful in attaining its
end, the principles on which it is based take on prestige in the eye of public
opinion. The medieval structure of deposit banking was fairly successful in
bringing savers and borrowers together. At least it was far superior to no
intermediation at all. Public opinion therefore came tO believe that the
passbook represented the proper way in which banks should gather savings from
the public. Two popular economic doctrines seem to have originated in this
manner.
interest on their assets, but only making legitimate nonusurious speculative
profits on foreign exchange movements.(De Roover, 1963, 108—141). The
London branches of the great Italian banks were the nucleus of banking in
England as early as the fourteenth century. It was not until the seventeenth
century that native English firms, mainly established goldsmiths, were
able to get a toehold in the banking industry on Lombard Street. These
Anglo—Saxon goldsmiths, however, did not invent banking in England, as the
chauvinist myth alleges (Merchant, c1676). Rather, they merely performed
the functions the "Lombards" had kept for themselves for centuries.
11n answer to a point raised by Paul Cootner, even during the "free
banking" era in the United States, banks were far from unregulated. Free
banking only meant that anyone complying with banking regulations was allowed
to open a bank, without having to obtain discretionary permission. In every
state, regulations took it for granted that banks would issue demand obliga-
tions (primarily bank notes) offset by term assets (often mortgages on western
lands).6
.
Thefirst doctrine is the countereconomic notion that interest accumulates,
rather than that it reflects the market price at which future payments are
discounted. This is a subtle distinction of which even many economists are
not fully aware. The accumulation notion is implicit in many of the falla-
cious theories of interest which Bhm—Bawerk first refuted only in the late
nineteenth century (1914/59, vol. I)) Nevertheless, we continue to see
evidence of this kind of thinking. For example, we see references to "the"
rate of interest without reference to maturity.2 Other evidence is the arbitrary
identification of repayments as either 'interesif' or"principal", and the presumption
that loans should be "redeemable" in advance, in effect giving them ambiguous
maturity.
The second doctrine is that "borrowing short and lending long", or
"creating liquidity" is a proper and valuable economic function of inter-
mediaries.3 This doctrine has been especially popular withgovernments and
bankers since the development of central banking and inflationary finance
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, since it makes the money—creating
role of banks seem more plausible. It certainly would be desirable if
somehow intermediaries could enable producers as a whole to embark on long—
term projects while guaranteeing to consumers as a whole the option of
consuming their wealth as soon as they desire. However, this is technologically
1Fisher's model is thoroughly Bhm—Bawerkian.Indeed, his Theory of
Interest is dedicated to Bhm—Bawerk.
kind of thinking probably tends to flatten the term structure
from its equilibrium shape. Indeed, requiring that the term structure be
flat would just eliminate the degrees of freedom in the Fisher model with
misintermediation.
3For example, Lapidus el at (1974),p. 27.7
impossible) Balanced intermediaries with negotiably rediscountable deposits
would guarantee any one individual complete liquidity (up to transactions
costs), and would provide the economy as a whole the option of consuming
ahead of plan to the extent this is technologically feasible.
In the United States today, these doctrines manifest themselves in
four principal categories of financial regulation or intervention that
encourage misintermediation. The first is the governmental subsidy to mis—
intermediation through the FDIC and FSLIC. Theoretically these are self—
financing insurance programs. However, since depositary institutions all
take qualitatively the same speculative stand on future interest ratemove-
ments, default due to interest rate changes is not an insurable risk? So
far the banking system has been able to finance the FDIC and FSLICby itself
from the seigniorage proceeds accruing to the zero ceiling (outside ofNew
England) on checking account interest and from the monopoly rents on time
and savings accounts when interest ceilings are effective.However, it
would take only about four defaults the size of Franklin National Bankto
exhaust (at least temporarily) the FDIC's reserves. In thatcase, the tax-
payers would one way or another take the loss, either through an emergency
act of Congress or inflationary finance at the Fed's initiative.3
The second category of regulation thatencourages misintermediation is
the ceiling structure on interest rates intermediariesmay pay on savings
and time deposits. Tobin (1970, 10) has noted that theobjective of the
11n terms ofFigure 2 below, no financial institution, however ingenious,
is capable of allowing the economy to consume the pointw0 on the c axis. Even
though this point is the sum of points that each individual is capale ofcon-
suming, this ability is contingent on not everyone doing it at once.The Law of
Large Numbers is of no help here, in spite of the conventional wisdomto the con-
trary (e.g. Gurley and Shaw 1960, 194).
2Hence the high failurerateamong state—sponsored insurance schemes prior to the FDIC (Kiebaner 1974, 136—7).
3Agcording to the chairman of the FDIC, ".. .werethe FDIC ever to exhaust
the funus available to it for insurancepurposes, I have no doubt that Congress8
FHLBB in imposing these ceilings on Savings and Loan Associations was to
attempt to recoup the capital losses these Associations suffered during the
interest rate rise of the Sixties. The FRB then was under pressure to impose
complementary ceilings on commercial bank time deposits, even though coniiner—
cial banks are not as extremely misintermediated as S & L's. As it happens,
these ceilings backfired by causing the "disintermediation" crises of 1966 and
1969. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that they reflect the continued
eagerness of regulators to preserve misintermediation by protecting it from
its inherent shortcomings.
The third category is the hobbling of the retail "certificate of deposit"
market that has appeared in the last fifteen years. CD's ideally allow the
saver to specify exactly when he wishes to dissave, and to know what interest
he will receive for that period. They also can let the bank know exactly S
when it can be legally called upon for cash outflows. Negotiability (or even
assignability) can allow the saver the flexibility to change his plans by
rediscounting his certificates, to the extent this is feasible given trans-
actions costs and what other savers and borrowers are doing. However, only
wholesale denomination CD's are allowed to be negotiable. Furthermore, as
a typical advertisement for these deposits points Out, "Federal regulations
allow withdrawal before maturity provided the rate of interest is reduced
to the regular savings account rate back to the date of issue and that three
would act promptly to provide the FDIC with such additional borrowing author-
ity or funds as might be needed to honor the Government's commitment to
insured depositors." (Wille 1975, 6) Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur
Burns has stated that the Fed would not hesitate to aid the FDIC even without
Congressional direction. Indeed, the $1.77 billion the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York lent the failing Franklin National Bank served largely to protect
uninsured depositors.
Recently the Hunt Commission (1972, 77) has proposed a further subsidy to
misintermediation through a Federal "insurance" program specifically designed
to reimburse losses due to interest rate risk.9
months' interest is forfeited at the regular savings account rates." This
formula, or variations on it, virtually destroys the potential attractiveness
of retail CD's. On the one hand, the saver is artificially locked in, even
if a third party or the bank itself stands willing to take the certificate
(or some fraction of it) off his hands on attractive terms. On the other
hand, the bank cannot be positive it will not be legally required to cash the
certificate before maturity.
The fourth category is the historical willingness of governments to
accommodate banks when they get into financial difficulties, whether caused
by inisintermediation, bad loans, or just mismanagement. An example is the
policy beginning in July, 1938, of allowing banks to value "sound" bonds on
the basis of book rather than market value.1 This willingness goes at least
as far back as the introduction of central banking during the Mercantilist
era. At least in part it is due to a recognition that banks that borrow
short and lend long can be forced to close through no fault of their own.
Because thrift institutions are essential for economic progress, and they
all happen to misintermediate, governments have taken special measures to
protect them from their own fragility. Because they are protected, they are
competitively viable against balanced intermediaries. Therefore all thrift
institutions continue to misintermediate, and so forth in perpetuity.
That such an elaborate structure of economic misconceptions and detri-
mental intervention is apparently grounded in the medieval usury doctrine,
which the Catholic Church already began backing out of in the sixteenth century,
is one of the most remarkable illustrations of Sir Henry Maine's dictum on survivals:
1-Klebaner (1974), 161. More recently, just before the December, 1975
default by the government of New York City, Arthur Burns announced that the
policy of the Fed would be to allow banks to cover up (not his choice of
words) losses on these bonds by carrying them at pre—default values (Wall
Street Journal, September 12, 1975). Banks are often able to make up such
losses eventually out of their seigniorage profits.10
Everybody conversant with the philosophy of opinion is aware that
a sentiment by no means dies out, of necessity, with the passing away
of the circumstances which produced it. It may long survive them;
nay, it may afterwards attain to a pitch and climax of intensity which
it never attained during their actual continuance. (1861/1960, 132)
Perhaps in a world with unregulated financial markets, financial intermediar-
ies would be forced by competition for the deposits of risk—averse depositors
to match the maturity structures of their assets and liabilities. However,
misintermediation and a regulatory environment encouraging misintermediation
have been with us for six hundred years. There is no reason to expect that
they will not be with us for another six hundred years. In the meanwhile,
we may expect business fluctuations arising from intertemporal disequilib-
rium to continue to disturb economic development. We can, however, hope to
understand how these fluctuations operate and the effects of conventional
policies intended to combat them.
Even without policies encouraging misintermediation, transactions costs
would prohibit the exact matching of maturities and the finding of the
Fisherian equilibrium term structure. To that extent, even in an unrestricted
market economy, misintermediation fluctuations might occur.1 However, these
fluctuations would be slight compared to the ones that actually occur in our
world of institutionalized misinterinediation. It is questionable whether it
would be worth trying to eliminate these residual fluctuations, given the
informational and transactions costs involved.
A Model of Fluctuations
The simplest world in which misintermedlation fluctuations are possible
is one in which there are only three periods, t1t0, "t",and"t2".
Wemay
has been emphasized by SerwinRosen.11
relate this model to the real world of continuous time by bracketing time
into three periods and identifying each bracket with the date that corresponds
to its economic center of gravity. (The bracket "t2" is open—ended, but
ordinarily has a finite center of gravity because the most distant future
is discounted by prices approaching zero.) Thus each t. may be thought of
either as an interval of time or as a particular point in time. We represent
real consumption goods during these three periods (aggregated over both
commodities and the relevant time bracket) by "c0t', "c11t, and
At t0 a real loan market exists in which c1 may be traded for c0 at a
price 'OOl' and c2 may be traded for c0 at price oO2 Also, c2 may be
traded for c1 at the implicit forward price
Ol2 ='OO2'OOl
(1)
All these prices are discounting factors ordinarily less than unity. The
first subscript represents the time in the market when the price is effec-
tive, the second subscript represents the time when the loan is to begin.
and the third subscript represents the time when the loan is to be repaid.
Fromthese prices we may compute the term structure of real interest
rates in the market at t0:
1Strictly speaking, for the intertemporal aggregation to be valid, we
must hold intrabracket forward rates constant (Liviatan 1966). In terms
of the continuous—time discount curve (McCulloch 1971, l975a), this implies
the appearance of discontinuities in this curve as we change interbracket
forward rates.
2 to to
These prices are equivalent to and in Hirshleifer's notation.
1 2
See NcCulloch (1971, l975a) for details of inferring these pure discount
prices from observations on bond prices.12
.
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Because of (1), if we know any two of these interest rates, we may calculate
the third. The long spot rate r002 is a weighted arithmetic average of the
short spot rate r001 and the forward rate r012.
Given a linear production technology, the factors (whether original
or produced in some earlier period) available to the economy will determine
a convex production possibilities set as shown in Figure 1. This set is the
set of all combinations of c0, c1, and c2 that are feasible as of to. The
production possibilities frontier P0P0P0 is the set of production streams
that are technologically efficient as of t0.1
For any given term structure of interest rates at t0, competitive
profit maximization will lead factor owners to plan to produce the output
supply stream S0 shown in Figure 2 with maximal present discounted value w0.
The budget plane of all consumption streams with this present value is also
shown in Figure 2. The slopes of its traces on the three planes defined by
the coordinate system are related to the interest rates indicated. The
steeper the line in absolute value, the higher the corresponding interest
rate.
1For a proof that such a frontier (Georgescu—Roegen's tlinput isoquant")
is, in a linear von Neumann model, concave toward the t0 origin 00, see
Georgescu—Roegen (1951), 107.13
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The economy's budget plane and planned production point (S0)
for a given term structure of interest rates during to.
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As of to,marketparticipants collectively think they can purchase any
point on this budget plane. However, it will be immediately apparent, i.e.
during t0, if they demand a different quantity of c0 than is being supplied.
Therefore the c0 components of the t0supply point S0 and the t0 demand point
D0 will coincide, and we may concentrate on the section through P0P0P0 and
the t0 budget plane indicated by the broken lines in Figure 2. There are
three possible locations of D0 relative to S0.
First, the t0 term structure of interest rates might just happen to have
Fisher's equilibrium shape, in which case D0 and S0 will coincide in all
three components. We will represent these interest rates by r001e, r002e,
and r012e.l In this case, as time moves forward to t1, participants will
find that they were planning to produce exactly as much c1 as they were
planning to consume. There will be no unanticipated change in interest
rates necessary to clear the market in t1. Unless there is a change in
tastes or an unforeseen technological development, r112 will just equal
r012 (here equal to r012e). Note that we have no a priori presumption about
the shape of this equilibrium term structure. The forward rate r01 may
be higher or lower than the short—term spot rate r001e. Both are ordinarily
positive for the reasons set forth by Bohm—Bawerk2, but since the marginal
1With unusual distributions of tastes and endowments, this equilibrium
might not be unique. However, we do not regard this as very likely.
2(1914/59, Vol. II, Book IV). Fisher's example of shipwrecked sailors
forced to survive on a fixed stock of figs does generate negative real inter-
est rates. But, as Fisher points out, "The fact that we seldom see an example
of zero or negative interest is because of the accident that we happen to
live in an environment so entirely different from that of the shipwrecked
sailors" (1930, 191—2). The Keynesian assertion (Klein 1966, 84—85) to the
contrary deserves more careful scrutiny than it has received, in view of
Bohm—Bawerk's argument. The possibility of a negative equilibrium nominal
interest rate (Keynes 1923/1932, 190) is more real.16
.
consumptionwants and productive activities are in general completely
different in the three periods, the span from t0 to t1 is historically
unique and different than the span from t1 to t2, so there is no reason for
the interest rates corresponding to these spans to be equal. In continuous
time, forward rates are probably smooth, but otherwise the equilibrium
forward curve can take on any shape: upward sloping, downward sloping, or
oscillating. Therefore equilibrium development may require a substantial
change in yields to maturity. However, this change will have been fully
anticipated in forward interest rates.
Second, the forward rate r012 may be higher than its equilibrium value,
In which case will have a lower c1 component and a higher c2 component
than S0, as shown in Figure 3,1 This is the case of an impending recession.
There is, in the minds of participants at to, an excess supply of c1 and a S
corresponding excess demand for c2. Walras' law requires that they be equal
in present (t0) value, but not that they individually be zero. As time moves
forward to t1, a recession will appear as the excess supply of c1 becomes
apparent in the current market for output. A value of r112, necessarily
lower than r012 and probably even lower than r012e, will be found that elim-
inates the excess supply.2 Therefore a recession will be associated with
an unanticipated fall in interest rates.
1That there will be an excess supply ofc1 if and only if r012 is
higher than r012 is demonstrated in the mathematical appendix.
Katz has pointed out that a fall in Interest rates might con-
ceivably enlarge the disequilibrium rather than closing it. However, for
this to be true we must be in the vicinity of an unstable equilibrium, and
the fall in Interest rates will eventually take us to an adjacent stable







A cross—section through Figure 2 when r012 is above its equl—





Third,the forward rate r012 may be lower than r012e, in which case
D0 will have a higher c1 component and a lower c2 component than S0, as
shown in Figure 4. This is the case of an impending boom. As time moves
forward to t1, an excess demand for current output will become apparent which
will drive r112 up abover012. Thus a disequilibrium boom is associated with
an unanticipated rise in interest rates.'
If business fluctuations are associated with unanticipated changes in
interest rates, rational expectations imply that those fluctuations cannot
exhibit regular cycles, but rather must be random in nature. Irving Fisher
(1925, 191) conjectured that the "business cycle" is nothing more than a
"Monte Carlo cycle", that is, that business has no more regular a pattern
than a gambler's luck at a fair casino. In another paper (McCulloch l975b)
we have tested this hypothesis and not found any strong evidence to the contrary.
Therefore the noncyclic nature of the fluctuations we have described is in
conformity with the observed business "cycle" rather than in conflict with it.
In terms of financial arrangements, an impending recession (as in
Figure 3) means that during t0 market participants are planning as a whole
to produce more c1 than they are planning to consume and to lend the proceeds
from selling this output at the forward rater012 in order to finance addi—
tional consumption ofc2 above and beyond their production of c2. However,
their planned lending is inconsistent, since no one is planning to borrow the
surplus c1 from them. During an impending boom, on the other hand (Figure 4),
participants are planning (during t0) to borrow during t1 in order to finance
additional consumption of c1 beyond their own production, and to repay these
loans during t2 out of their surplus production. In this case the inconsistency
Note that the excess supply or demand forc1 does not actually appear
during t1, but only has reality in terms of the plans for the future people
had during t0. As Friedman has noted, "Inflationary Gap is never of the past
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isthat no one is planning to lend them this c1. If all planned future
borrowing and lending, whether by ultimate borrowers, by ultimate savers,
or by financial intermediaries, were precontracted during to, this kind
of inconsistency could not arise.
The Austrian Effect
Misintermediation fluctuations would involve no technological ineffi-
ciency and no welfare loss, except possibly for the small discrepancy between
output and its ideal level, were it not for the contraction of the pro-
duction possibilities frontier between t0 andt1. At t0, the economy can
produce any point on P0P0P0 in Figures 1 and 2, or on its section P0P0 in
Figures 3 and 4. To produce any particular output stream, certain productive
activities will be necessary duringt0, t1, and t2. In general, these activity
vectors will be different for every different output stream. In particular,
the t0 activities appropriate to the point S0 will be appropriate to that
point and to no other point on the t0 production possibilities frontier.
Therefore during t1 the production possibilities set is not the set of points
under P0P0, but only a proper subset of that set. The point S0 will still
be feasible, but since it is too late to go back and change the activities
conducted during t0, elsewhere the production possibilities frontier will have
shrunk, to P1P1 as shown in Figure 5. P0P0 and P1P1 will osculate at
but P1P1 will have a lower transformation elasticity than P0P0 in a neighbor—
1 2 hood of S0 and so will fall away from P0P0 as we move away from S0.
'It is not actuallynecessary that P1P1 have a lower transformation
elasticity than P0P0 at S0 itself, but only in a deleted neighborhood of S.
2Phrased differently, the long—run transformation curve in Figure 5
will be the envelope of short—run curves like P1p1 correspondiiig to difterent






The "Austrian effect." As time moves forward from t0 to tj,




This principle of vanishing intertemporal production possibilities has
long been emphasized by the Austrian economists Mises and Hayek.1 Essentially
the way it works is that the numbers of the various types of capital goods
produced during t0 for later use are inappropriate to any point on the t0
transformation surface except S0. We cannot say that there were too many or
too few capital goods produced during to, but only the wrong mix. This is
the reason why Austrian writers, such as Lachmann (1966, p. 115), place such
great emphasis on the heterogeneity of capital goods. A model with homogen-
eous capital hardly begins to deal with the problem of intertemporal plans,
because according to it, the only decision to be made in t0 is between c0 and
the future, without reference to how output is to be allocated over thefuture.2
Because of this "Austrian effect", it is essential for technological
efficiency that production follow through with output stream S0. This will
occur if r112 equals r012, but not otherwise. The unanticipated change in
interestrates necessary to bring the t1 demand point D1 into coincidence
with the t1 supply point S1 will require that S1lieinside P0P0, as shown in
Figures6 and 7. Therefore misintermediation fluctuations, whether booms or
recessions, necessarily entail technological inefficiency and wasted resources.
1See von Mises (1924/53, 357—66, and 1963, 553, 560, and 564). Indeed,
the present theory grew out of an attempt to Fisherize Mises' theory of bus-
iness fluctuations. Note, however, that in our theory, the recession is
associated with an unanticipated fall in interest rates rather than a rise,
as in the Mises—Hayek theory. Hansen's critique (1951, 384—93) of Hayek's
popularization of Mises' theory completely misses the essential concept of
the time specificity of investment.
2Much of.theoriginal development of the Austrian effect was in terms
of the conversion of "circulating capital" into "fixed capital". Ineffect,
this implies that P0P0 is a straight line5 while P1P1 forms a right angle at
Wehave here improved on this original version by making it more margin—
alist —thatisto say, more "Austrian".
ShermanMaiselhas pointed out that producers deliberately build flex-
ibility intotheir capital equipment. That is to say, during t0 they may aim
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Factor Incomes and Unemployment
Given the economy's endowment of original factors of production in
and t2, and of produced factors produced beforet1, there will be a derivable
vector of equilibrium factor prices corresponding to each output price
ratio (i.e. each price of c1 in terms ofc2 and corresponding interest rate
linking t1 to t2). The prices of those factors of production that are rela-
tively intensive in the production ofc1 will move, relative to the prices
of factors intensive in c2, in the same direction the price ofc1 moves rela-
tive to that of c2.1 Furthermore, by the "magnification effect", the relative
factor price change will be larger than the relative output price change,
in such a way that if the price ofc1 falls relative to c2, the price of
c1—intensive factors will fall relative to both outputs.
Which factor services, then, are c1—intensive, and which arec2—intensive?
Factor services available during t1 contribute to bothc1 and c2, so it is
not immediately apparent how to classify them. However, factor services
available during t2 obviously contribute nothing toc1. Therefore t2 factor
services must be c2—intensive. It follows that t1 factor services, taken as
a whole, must be c1—intensive. Individual factors may be found during
t1
that are c2—intensive, but the general presumption must be that the real income
of t1 factors, whether the current services of labor, land, or capital equip-
ment, will be directly related to the price of c1 relative to
c2.
with as low an elasticity of transformation as it does from S0. Ifr112 equals
r012, they will incur a small loss, because they cannot quite produce S0, but
this cost will be worth incurring becauser112 might be far from r012. In
spite of this valid point, balanced intermediation will remain beneficial,
since it will minimize the price changes that do occur, which are still costly.
Furthermore, it will reduce the amount of expensive flexibility producers will
need to build in.
'See Johnson (1971, 18) for thecase when there are only two factors.
While during t0 it is necessary to keep the heterogeneity of capital goods
in mind in order to capture the "Austrian Effect", by t1 this effect has already
taken place, and we may aggregate factors into "c1—intensive" and "c2—intensive"
for the purpose of analyzing factor incomes during the fluctuation.26
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Duringa recession, there is an unanticipated fall in the price of
in terms of c2. Corresponding to the anticipated price 1/5012 there was
one set of equilibrium real remunerations for t1 factors. Corresponding to
the price l/ô2 necessary to clear the t1 markets are lower equilibrium
remunerations. Therefore if factors had been expecting rewards corresponding
to the anticipated price of c1, full employment during t1 will require that
most if not all current factors accept an unanticipated fall in their
real incomes.1
If prices adjusted instantly and smoothly to the excess supply that
appears during t1 in a recession, there would be a fall (relative to expec-
tations) in real wages, real land rents, and in real returns to capital.
In practice, however, it will take some time for factor owners to feel out
the market and revise their expectations.2 We would therefore expect to find a
misintermediation recession to be associated with pervasive, though temporary,
unemployment of workers, factories, farms, and other factors of production.
Artificially maintaining pre—recession wages and factor returns would
stall the market's process of salvaging the most it can from the malinvest—
ment that occurred during to. Instead of moving from S0 to l' production
would move to a point inside of P1P1 that would represent prolonged factor
unemployment.
1The extent to which factors duringt can anticipate the returns cor-
responding to the anticipated price of c1 Is a subtle question that deserves
further exploration. However, there is even less reason to believe that they
will have been anticipating returns correspodning to any other price of c1.
2The "search" literature provides numerous insights into thisprocess.
See Stigler (1961), Phelps (1970), and Rothschild (1973).
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Thus, the policies of Hoover and Roosevelt during the '30's were exactly
the opposite of what was necessary if the Great Depression was the result of
mlsintermediation. We are told that
Hoover believed that the maintenance of wage rates would contribute
to sustaining economic activity and employment. This belief was
simply the application to the depression of the general American
high—wage philosophy that became popular in the 1920's. One of
Hoover's first acts after the 1929 stock market crash was to summon
industrial leaders to the White House and ask them to pledge not to
cut wage rates. They agreed, and there was at the time little argu-
ment over the wisdom of this polciy. Later, of course, wage rates
were cut, and by 1932 there emerged some public argument in favor of
wage reduction as a cure for unemployment. However, Hoover did not
change his position. (Stein 1966, 192)
Hoover's voluntary programs were unable to keep nominal wages from falling
altogether, in spite of his great influence with business leaders. However,
he was able to prevent them from falling as fast as consumer prices. When
he left the White House in 1933, real wages were actually higher than at
the beginning of the Depression,1 and unemployment stood at 20.6% —even
using Darby's correction (1976) of the BLS figures. At the same time,
Hoover's Federal Farm Board acted as a Federally sponsored cartel in an
unprecedented attempt to support farm incomes (Rothbard 1963, 203—9).
Roosevelt continued and even strengthened Hoover's policies of resisting
market adjustment with the NRA,2 minimum wage legislation, and the Wagner Act,
1Average hourly earnings in 1957—59 dollars for citywage earners in
manufacturing rose from 93.8 in 1930 to 97.OQ in 1933. These figures would
would seem to contradict Gaibraith's claim (1955, 142—6, 188) that Hoover's
efforts were entirely ineffectual.
2CMrlesKindleberger (l97, 14—15) recalls that when hissalary as an
qff ice boy was increased in 1933, his boss made it clear that he had given
him the raise because he was required to by the NRA"andfor no other
reason28
.
whichgave unions monopoly power over wages. An interesting hypothesis is
that it was not until a major segment of the work force had its real wage
expectations drastically reduced, by being forced to work for low and almost
constant nominal wages in the military during World War II while the price
1
level shot up by 51.7%, that the country clearly came out of the depression.
Compulsory reduction of real wages would have been effective, but not neces-
sary to cure the Depression's unemployment rate, since real wages would have
fallen of their own accord without the Hoover/Roosevelt policy of artificially
maintaining them.
Among current activities, we would expect the extractive industries to
be particularly sensitive to interest rate movements. At high interest rates,
it pays to exploit mineral deposits relatively quickly. At low interest
rates, it pays to leave the minerals in the ground for a longer period and to
employ time—consuming techniques of lowering costs. We would therefore expect
to see the extractive industries, and the new capital goods industries which
use up the current output of such raw materials, lapse into unanticipated
inactivity when interest rates unexpectedly fall during a recession. The demand
for capital goods will tend to be met instead with rehabilitated or salvaged
old machines. Mines and steel mills will languish, while junk parts yards
will thrive, comparatively speaking. Ironically, the new capital goods indus-
try may actually be more active with high interest rates than with low.
Welfare Considerations
In the actual world of diverse tastes and factor endowments, we cannot
unambiguously say whether misintermediation fluctuations are a good or a bad
thing, since some people will benefit and others will lose. Inorder to make
____________ .
1From1941 to 1947.29
blanket welfare statements, we must simplify somewhat, and think in terms of
a "representative participant" who has representative tastes and representative
factor endowment. The economy will then behave as if it were made up of a
very large number of carbon copies of this individual, who will be in unani-
mous agreement as to how well off they are.1
Whenarecession is impending, the representative participant will plan
to consume an output stream which gives him higher utility (U0) than any
feasible stream, since the corresponding indifference surface, a cross—section
through which is shown in Figure 8, is separated from P0P0P0 by the t0 budget plane.
The equilibrium utility level U, which is attainable, therefore lies below
U0, as shown. (The curve labeled Ue in Figure 8 does not quite touch P0P0 except
in the unlikely case that the c0 component of S0 and is unaffected by the
presence of a disequilibrium between c1 and c2.) Therefore an impending
recession provides the representative participant with a sense of euphoria;
his anticipated welfare level is higher than any feasible level.
When the recession strikes during t1, the representative participant
finds that the best he can do is to consume D1. This point lies inside
P0P0P0 and therefore provides a lower utility level, U1, than the highest
attainable utility level Ue Thus a recession implies a welfare loss. Fur-
thermore, since Ue lies below U0, the recession involves an even bigger dis-
appointment of expectations. (We must evaluate the recession on the basis of
U1insteadof U0, since U1 represents the utility level of actually realized
consumption, while U0 is only the utility from planned consumption.)
1For this simplification to be valid, individuals' tastes must be iden-









The welfare loss accompanying a recession. The representative
participant anticipated utility level U0 during to, but ends up with
U1 in t1,insteadof the level Ue attainable with equilibrium growth.








Although S1 (equivalent to D1) is technologically inefficient in terms
of the production possibilities available at t0 it provides higher welfare
than S0, since it is the highest utility point on P1P1. Therefore S1 is the
economically efficient production point for a recession that has materialized,
even though it is technologically inefficient. It would be even better not
to have had the recession in the first place, but by t1 it is too late to
prevent it. The best that can be done is to salvage utility level U1 from the
situation.1Ud, the utility level of S0, is even lower than U1.
A boom has the same welfare implications as a recession. As shown in
Figure 9, an impending boom causes a sense of euphoria, with a planned
utility level U0 higher than the equilibrium level U. When the boom mater-
ializes, participants are stuck with a utility level U1 that is lower than
U and a fortiori lower than U
e 0
We therefore arrive at the odd conclusion that a boom is as much a
disappointment as a recession. It is true that as producers participants
are pleasantly surprised by the briskness of demand. However, this benefit
is more than offset by the deterioration of the terms yn which they as con-
sumers can buy that output. The financial side of this situation is that
during t0, the representative participant was planning to borrow at a low
interest rate to finance additional consumption of c1. When he gets to t1,
he finds that no one was planning to lend him this purchasing power, and the
interest rate has to go up sufficiently high above r012 to discourage him from
borrowing.
1As in Mises' theory, we mustregard the situation leading up to the
recession as retrogression and the recession itself as progress (1963, 576).32
Figure 9
The welfare loss accompanying a boom. Again the representative
participant suffers a disappointment from U0 to U1, and ends up with
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The ability of misintermediation to raise the representative participant's
pre—fluctuation planned utility from to U0 helps explain the historical
survival power of tnisintermediation) If inisintermediation merely introduced
uncertainty, without altering the utility of the expected consumption stream,
risk aversion would have worked more powerfully against it over the centuries.
However, it holds outtheprospect of a consumption stream with higher utility
than is attainable with balanced intermediation. The apparently improved
utility of the mean is capable of outweighing the expected utility loss from
the increased variance, or so it appears to participants during to. If the
representative participant fully understood the economic implications of
misintermediation, he would realize that if he does not precontract during t0
all planned future borrowing and lending, interest rates will systematically
move in the direction necessary to disappoint his plans. In practice, how-
ever, individuals' economic situations are so diverse and interest rate
uncertainty such a small portion of total economic uncertainty that misinter—
mediation fluctuations, while possibly the major component of aggregate fluc-
tuations, are only a small component of each individual's changes in fortunes.
Considering that most individuals do not even understand interest, let alone
misintermediation, it is easy to see how they might completely lose sight of
the systematic component in interest rate movements.
Misintermediation implies changes in interest rates that are systematic,
but systematic only in the sense of being correlated with an unobserved
variable, namely the production and consumption plans of the representative
paragraph is in partial answer to a point raised by William
Sharpe.34
.
participant.It is true that everything necessary to construct this variable
is "known" at to. However, this is not usable information, since its compon-
ents are known to different individuals. By Hayek's principle of the "f rag—
mentation of knowledge" (1973, 14), everyone is necessarily ignorant of
almost everything that is known to anyone. Only if someone were to perform
the superhuman task of putting everyone's plans together would this variable
1
be observable.In many cases, market prices allow individuals to use infor-
mation known to other individuals without actually having to know that infor-
mation themselves. In a hypothetical world in which balanced intermediation
were not actively discouraged, the term structure of interest rates would
serve that function by allowing individuals to coordinate their intertemporal
production and consumption plans with those of other individuals without
having to know what any of those other individuals is planning. S
Money and Business Fluctuations
In the real world there is a strong correlation between fluctuations
in the rate of monetary growth and fluctuations in the rate of growth of
real output (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). A completely exogenous fluc-
tuation in the money supply could easily affect real output. One possible
has been suggested that polls might provide information about the
average individual's position. However, it is hard to believe that individ-
uals would give as much attention to a questionnaire as they would to actual
financial commitments. Furthermore, knowing whether a given sample of
respondents is in fact representative is almost as difficult as knowing
what financial position is representative. In any event, the fact that no
such poll has ever been taken means that historically, at least, the represen-
tative participant's position has not been known, so there is no inconsistency
if we posit the unavailability of this information to explain past fluctuations.
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mechanism is through Walras' Law, which we used above with reference to
the real intertemporal economy) A monetary contraction, say, would lead
to an excess demand for money, offset by an excess supply of real goods in
general. This excess supply would last until deflation removed the excess
demand for real cash balances.
Another possible mechanism works via the short—run Phillips Curve. The
slowdown in the rate of inflation caused by a slowdown in the rate of mone-
tary growth would ordinarily be largely unanticipated. Until inflation expec-
tations caught up with the actual inflation rate, unemployment would be
above the "natural" unemployment rate, and physical output would be below
trend.
However, there is a mechanism by which misintermediation fluctuations
could lead to disturbances in the money supply. The unanticipated rise in
interest rates that accompanies a misintermediation boom would lead to unan-
ticipated capital losses on any long—term securities or loans in the banks'
portfolios. These losses will jeopardize the safety of the banks and make
them more prone to failure in the event of runs. Therefore a misintermedia—
tion boom may lead to a banking crisis and monetary contraction followed by
a deflationary depression. We would expect this phenomenon to have been
particularly strong prior to the founding of the FDIC.
On the other hand, the unanticipated fall in interest rates that accom-
panies a misintermediation recession will lead to unanticipated capital gains
on long—term assets. These gains will leave the banks in a good capital
1This is the aspect of Walras' Law emphasized by Lange (1942).36
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position,from which they can safely launch a monetary expansion. Thus a
misintermediation recession mayendin a bank expansion and inflationary boom.
Furthermore, monetary instability can lead to conditions that permit the
type of intertemporal disequilibrium we have discussed to appear, through
the following mechanism: Monetary instability will tend to cause an erratic
price level, so that participants will lose confidence in their ability to
predict the future price level. For a given maturity, lenders would insist
on a risk premium on nominal bonds above the effective real rate plus expected
inflation. On the other hand, borrowers will insist on a nominal rate
below the effective real rate plus expected inflation. The only way they
will be able to agree on a nominal rate is for them to settle on a shorter
maturity than corresponds to their actual dissavings and repayment plans.1 In
this manner, inflation uncertainty can break the link between financial instru—
ment maturities and the dates of real consumption and production plans.
Although intermediaries will not be the culprits, the same sort of fluctuations
would occur.2
We therefore see monetary and misintermediation factors in business
fluctuations as complementary and interrelated, rather than as mutually
exclusive alternatives. However, we would expect the pure misintermediation
1Brealey and Schaefer (1976) note the effect on lenders and conclude that
inflation uncertainty leads to a liquidity premium. However, when the effect
on borrowers is also considered, the only presumption that can be drawn is
that maturities will be shortened.
2Purchasing power bonds would get around this problem, but they are
not a viable alternative until Congress reverses the 1933 joint resolution
against gold clauses. We are told by Cynthia Lichtenstein that on the basis
of this resolution the courts interpret cost—of—living indexed bonds as
contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable. In a recent talk at
MIT, Alan Blinder cited a recent instance of such a ruling in a Tennessee
court. Variable rate loans are unsatisfactory substitutes for indexation,
since they leave the real interest rate uncertain.37
effect to be potentially much larger than the pure monetary effect, because
of the magnitudes on which they operate. An intertemporal disequilibrium
acts on the present discounted value of all future consumption (and produc-
tion). A disequilibrium may be small as a percentage of this total and
still involve enormous stakes. On the other hand, a monetary disturbance
will involve only a fraction of the money supply, which in turn is only a
fraction of just one year's consumption and production. The excess supply or
demand for goods corresponding to an excess demand or supply of money will
therefore be only a small fraction of the total demand for goods over time.
The power of banks to create money, whether in the form of checking accounts
or old—fashioned circulating bank notes, is inextricably tied up with their
habit of mismatching asset and liability maturities. Therefore balanced
intermediation will require some changes in the monetary system. The new
"liquid asset mutual funds" (on which large—denomination checks can now be
drawn)and banks conforming to the old—fashioned "real bills doctrine" have
desirablefeatures in this respect, since they at least reduce the mismatching
of maturities. One hundred percent reserve banking, which many have advocated,
would permit completely balanced intermediation. However, it would preclude
the efficiency gains from payment of interest on checking accounts (Johnson
1969, 31—37). We have not yet resolved in our own mind what the best way would
be of integrating the monetary and intermediation systems.
Fiscal Policy
The conventional macroeconomic solution for a recession is increased
government spending to absorb the excess supply of output. We now examine
the welfare implications of such fiscal policy in the light of our model.
The increased government spending can take two extreme forms. It can
either provide services consumers would have purchased anyway (consumption—
displacing fiscal policy) or can consist entirely of wasteful make—work38
.
projectsto employ idle factors.'
If during a recession the government bought up the excess supply of
current output and then gave this output back to the public without charge,
it could induce participants to consume what they had originally planned to
produce (S0 in Figure 8). Doing this would require the government somehow to
drive a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal
rate of transformation, in effect by taxation of c2 and subsidization of c1.
The marginal rate of transformation between c1 and c2 would then be undisturbed
from its t0 anticipated value and no alterations of production plans or
unanticipated changes in (before tax) factor incomes would be required for
full employment. However, as was noted in the next—to—the—last section, the
utility level Ud that would be achieved by this consumption—displacing fiscal
policy is necessarily lower than U1, the utility level that would be achieved byS
movingproduction as quickly as possible to S1. (See Figure 8.) Therefore
consumption—displacing fiscal policy actually aggravates the welfare loss
caused by a misintermediation recession.
Keynes (1936, 128—131) argued that there is an advantage to expenditure that
is wholly wasteful and therefore does not compete with what little demand
there is for current output. As unemployed c1—intensive factors are diverted
into these make—work activities, the transformation curve between c1 and c2
11t is sometimes assumed that the increased spending will be on "public
goods" that consumers would not have purchased if left to themselves, but
which do increase net consumer welfare. However, if there are any such goods,
the government should not wait for a recession to provide them. We there-
fore assume that all desirable governmental public goods projects aie
undertaken with or without a recession, so that all deliberate counter—
recessionary fiscal policy is either consumption—displacing or wasteful.
We also assume that all future tax liabilities are fully anticipated by
the present (only) generation. Interesting consequences arise if they are not,
but this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.39
will shrink as shown in Figure 10. The Rybczynski line RR is the locus of
points at which the shrunken transformation curves have the same marginal
rate of transformation as curve P1P1 (and P0P0) does at S0.1 At the point W
along this line where this marginal rate of transformation equals the mar-
ginal rate of substitution in consumption, the unemployed factors will be
just absorbed without any disturbance to anticipated interest rates or factor
prices. Again, the realized utility level (U.) with fiscal policy is neces-
sarily lower than the level U1 that would be attained in its absence.
While either sort of fiscal policy is worse, from the point of view of
the representative participant, than no fiscal policy at all, it is not cer-
tain which will be the worse of the two. If the elasticity
of substitution of the indifference curves2 is high, so that they are relatively
flat, the U indifference curve may pass beneath S0 as shown in Figure 10,
and the wasteful variety will be worse. On the other hand, if it is low,
so that they are sharply bent, the U indifference curve may pass above S0,
and the consumption—displacing variety will be worse. Ironically,
wasteful fiscal policy might actually be a lesser evil than consumption—
displacing fiscal policy.
The utility level U1 is the best that the market can possibly achieve,
with instantaneous factor price adjustment and relocation. In practice,
1See Johnson (1971, 35—39). Note that if tastes are homothetic, the
point W can be constructed as the intersection of RR with the ray O1D0 (not
shown).
2From the standpoint of
t0,therelevant substitution elasticity is the
"direct" elasticity which holds the quantity of c0 constant.40 S
Figure 10
The welfare loss from wholly wasteful fiscal policy.Make—
work employment of factors contracts the transformation curve from
P1P1 to PP, where RR is a Rybczynski line. The representative











this adjustment will take time and there will be some output lost due to
unemployed resources, so a utility level somewhat below U1 will actually be
attained without fiscal policy. Note, however, that the worst the market
can do is not adjust factor prices at all, leaving the economy with welfare
level U, the ideal welfare level from wasteful fiscal policy.
Fiscal policy will also take some time to implement, since the problem
must be first recognized, then expenditure programs authorized, and finally
these programs put into effect. To that extent, market adjustment will par-
tially take place, so that fiscal policy will in practice achieve a welfare
level somewhat above Ud or U.' However, if the fiscal policy somehow works
instantaneously, say through the use of tautomatic stabilizers", this gain
will be lost.
Conclusion
In his General Theory, Keynes touched on many of the points we have
raised in this paper. The following observation, for example, is reminiscent
of what we have called the "Austrian Effect," and may indeed have been sug-
gested by Keynes' exposure to Mises and Hayek:
In optimum conditions..., production should be so organized as to
produce in the most efficient manner compatible with delivery at
the dates at which consumers' demand is expected to become effective. (215)
Clearly Keynes was aware of the fact that different production activities
are necessary today in order to produce different shaped output streams
efficiently.
1This welfare gain is contingent on the fiscalprogram decided on being
of a size appropriate to the excess supply that still exists when it goes
into effect. There is a danger, however, that because of the recognition
and implementation lags, it will instead be appropriate to the larger excess
supply that existed when it was conceived, leading to the familiar problem
of "destabilizing stabilization policy."42
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Consideralso this passage relating to consumption:
actof individual saving means——so to speak——a decision not to
have dinner to—day. But it does not necessitate a decision to have
dinner or to buy a pair of boots a week hence or a year hence or to
consume any specified thing at any specified date....
If saving consisted not merely in abstaining from present consump-
tion but in placing simultaneously a specific order for future con-
sumption, the effect might indeed be different. (1936, 210)
We would have no quarrel at all with this statement if the word "commitment"
were substituted for "decision"The whole essence of the misintermediation
problem is that individuals' time—specific consumption decisions are not
passed on to producers. -Conceivably,consumption plans for the future might
not be effectively time—specific, as would be the case if indifference curves
between c1 and c2 were straight lines. Misintermediation fluctuations would
not then be a problem, because consumers could be induced to consume exactly
the stream producers were planning to produce with no unanticipated change in
interest rates or welfare loss. However, the same considerations that lead
us to expect diminishing marginal utility also lead us to expect that indiffer-
ence curves will be curved away from the origin.1 We therefore believe that
consumption decisions, at least for the satisfaction of those wants that recur
in each time period, do have an important time—specificity.
Although our model is in some sense Keynesian in that it builds on a
few ideas Keynes would have agreed with, we strongly disagree with Keynes'
crucial contention that saving "is not a substitution of future consumption—
demand for present consumption—demand," but rather "a net diminution of such
demand" (1936, 210).
1See McCulloch and Smith (1976).
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We have attempted to demonstrate that such an assumption is not necessary
in order to explain the occasional appearance of an excess supply of all or
almost all types of current output and factor services.
Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn from our model is
that counter—recessionary fiscal policy,even (or particularly) when it achieves
its goal of full employment, actually aggravates the welfare loss accompany-
ing a misintermediation recession. We therefore regard Keynes' best—remembered
policy recommendation, which cQnstitutes the core of macroeconomic teaching
today, as being in fact detrimental to economic welfare.44
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MATHEMATICALAPPENDIX
The assertion made in the text that there will be a planned excess
supply of c1 if and only if the forward rate r012 is too high seems obvious.
However, the possibility that the c0 component of S0 and D0 will not equal
that of the equilibrium stream makes the proof a little more difficult than
it would otherwise be, even in a world which may be characterized by our
representative participants.
e e e Let the row vectors=(l5ool, S002) and S =0-, ooiOO2 )be
the actual and equilibrium intertemporal price vectors for t0.
Let d =(d0,d1, d2)T and s =(s0,s, 52)T be column vectors represent-
ing the disequilibrium planned demand and supply streams represented in the
figures by points D0 and S0, so that d0 =5.Let 5e =50e81e 52e)T repre—
sent the equilibrium stream, for which supply and demand plans coincide. Let
c =(c0,c1, c2)T be an arbitrary stream of consumption goods.
The equilibrium budget plane is the set of points c for which
—e) • Al)
The set of points on the origin side of this plane is given by
—Se)< 0 . A2)
Except for 5e the whole production possibilities set lies on the origin
side of this plane. Since s is a member of this set different from 5e, we
have 545
—5e)< • A3)
The actual disequilibrium budget plane is given by the set of points c,
such that
S(c—s)=O A4)
Point d lies on this plane, and d0 =oso we have
o =(1, 002)(d —s) A5)
=(0,ooi 5002)(d —s) A6)
=(0,1, 6012)(d —s). A7)
Suppose, contrary to the assertion we are trying to prove, that d1 >s1and d2 <s2
even thoughr012 >roi2e(and therefore O12 <012e)•It would then follow
from A7) that
(0, 1, 6e)(d — < 0 A8)
(0, 6e)(d—s)<0 A9)
(1,e)(d—s)<0 AlO)
Adding A3) and AlO), we have
6e(d —e)<0, All)46
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sothat d must lie on the origin side of the equilibrium budget plane.
Since our representative participant would select point 5e from the
equilibrium budget plane, 5e must be preferred to any point below this
plane, and therefore to d. However, 5e being in the production possi-
bilities set, is on the origin side of the disequilibrium budget plane, so
we may also conclude that d (which the average participant selects from
this plane) is preferred to 5eThis contradiction of the axioms of re—
e
vealed preference completes our proof that d1 < s1 whenever r012 > r012
The above theorem is valid no matter how far we are from equilibrium.
Some additional propositions of interest may be proven, but only for small
deviations from equilibrium. Let "E" represent the logarithmic differentia-
tion operator, defined for any variable x by
S
Ex=dx/x=d(lnx) . A12)
Define k1 to be the share of 1—th period consumption in the equilibrium
budget:
ki =ee/(e + e e + &e 82e) Al3)
Let a .andt.. respectively be the Allen elasticities of substitution in
ij 13









Ek.i-.. =0. A17) i=0 1 13
Convexity towards the origin of the indifference surfaces implies that
< 0. Because of Al6), .ill therefore usually, but not necessarily
always, have
> 0 ,i#j (usually). A18)
We will define the sign of so that convexity of the transformation
surface away from the origin likewise implies that < 0. We then will
have
> 0 ,i j(usually). Al9)
For a utility maximizing individual, theo have the property that
Ed1 =k.a.EcSü0
, A20)
if utility and prices other than are held constant. Similarly, the





formovements along the transformation surface keeping the value of output
maximized and holding other prices constant. For small movements from equi-
librium, for which income effects are negligible, and using c0 as numeraire,
we will therefore have
Es1 =—k1't11E5001—k2r21E5002,i=0,1, 2 A22)
and
Ed1 =k1a11E5001+ k2c52iEcSOO2 ,I=0,1, 2 . A23)
Because the market for current (t0) output must clear, we have
.
Es0=Ed0. A24)
We have seven equations and eight unknowns. We are therefore left
with the one degree of freedom inherent in the 3—period world. Solving
equations A22)—A24) in terms of ES012 (=E6002 —Ec5001)gives
k2(a02 + T02)
E3001 =
k0(T00+ a00) Ec5012 A25)
—k1(a01 +
EtS002 =






In order to get A25) through A27) in terms of interest rates, we must




Substituting A28) through A30) into A25) through A27),
(t2 —t1)k2(a02+ T02)
dr001 =
(t1—t0)k0(t00+ a00) dr012 A31)
—(t2 —t1)k1(001 + tOi)
dr002 =
(t2—tQ)k0(T00+ 000) dr012 A32)
(t2 —t1)k1k2(a02t01—001t02)
Es0 =Ed0=
k0(T00+ 000) dr012 A33)
The denominators of A3l) —A33)are always negative by the convexity condi-
tions on and t... The numerators of A31) and A32) are usually (though
not necessarily) positive and negative respectively. The numerator of A33)
maybeof either sign, but there is a weak presumption as to its sign. If
c0, c1, and c2 enter preferences symmetrically, we would expect 001002.
However, by arguments related to those used to support the Austrian effect,
we might expect to find T01< T02 ,makingthe numerator of A33) negative.









and = >0(weak presumption) . A36)
ur012ur012
A34) and A35) show that disequilibrium cannot be associated with too
high or too low a general level of yields to maturity during the prefluctu—
ation period. Some will be too high and some too low. Rather, an impending
recession (dr012 >0)means that the t0 yield curve is either insufficiently
downward sloping or excessively upward sloping,being too low at the short
end and too high at the long end. The opposite is true for an impending boom.
A36) indicates that t0 consumption and production have a slight tendency
to be higher than their equilibrium value for a recession and lower for a
boom, provided the disequilibrium is small. Intuitively, the limited trans-
formation opportunities between c0 and c 1 tend to pull c0 in the same direc-
tion as c1. For large disequilibria, income effects will begin to be impor-
tant. Since U0 lies above Ue for both booms and recessions, income effects
will be positive if, as is natural tO assume, no period's consumption is in-
ferior, and ignoring distribution effects. Therefore, if the disequilibrium
is sufficiently large, and a01T02sufficientlyclose to a02t01, we would
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